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The second half of Baixin Bank is not marked by wild growth, but by desolation.
Recently, CITIC Bixin Bank (hereinafter referred to as “Bixin Bank”) disclosed its latest performance results.
Data shows that in 2025, Bixin Bank’s revenue reached 5.93B yuan, a year-on-year increase of 28.17%; net profit was 453 million yuan, a sharp decline of 30.52% year-on-year. In 2025, the bank’s inclusive micro-loans surged by 40%, and its consumer loan “Hao Hui Hua” disbursed 17.3 billion yuan.
It is not hard to see that Bixin Bank’s income has grown, but profit margins have continued to decline, marking the second consecutive year of significant profit reduction for the bank. Looking at the longer term, Bixin Bank’s net profit in 2025 was only slightly higher than in 2021, but far below 2022 and 2023.
From the “AI Financial Benchmark” to the “Compliance Storm,” Bixin Bank has spent eight years illustrating a wild growth phase followed by a concentrated outbreak of its aftereffects.
1. The Only Survivor
Looking nationwide, there are few direct banking institutions without physical branches remaining.
In 2025, Postal Savings Bank of China and Beijing Bank’s direct banking subsidiaries were successively absorbed and merged. Bixin Bank has become a singleton—both the first in China and the only independent operating legal entity direct bank.
This “only” is not a badge of honor but a warning.
In 2017, CITIC Bank partnered with Baidu, with a registered capital of 5.63B yuan, launching an innovative experiment combining a “bank license + internet DNA.” At that time, there were over 100 direct banks domestically, but now only more than 10 remain. Consolidation or shutdowns have become the mainstream choices.
Why has Bixin Bank “survived”? The answer lies in the rapid growth of personal consumer loans. From 2022 to 2024, the proportion of comprehensive personal consumer loans remained above 75%. Relying on online products like “Hao Hui Hua,” the scale expanded.
In 2024, revenue growth rate plummeted from double digits to 2.03%, and net profit dropped from 855 million yuan to 652 million yuan. Although it rebounded in the first three quarters of 2025, it still hasn’t returned to previous levels.
More dangerously, asset quality deteriorated: non-performing loan ratio rose from 1.36% in 2023 to 1.50% in 2024, corporate loans shrank by 90%, and the bank has essentially abandoned corporate business, relying solely on consumer loans to support its operations.
Behind the scale expansion is frequent “red line” violations in compliance.
In September 2025, Bixin Bank received its highest penalty ever—11.2M yuan—and Assistant President Yu Xiaohong was disqualified from her position for five years.
The latest regulatory rules have clarified that banks are responsible for collection efforts. However, Bixin Bank still outsourced a large portion of collection activities, losing control over third-party methods. The “AI-native” risk control concept, which is highly efficient and precise during pre-loan customer acquisition, becomes wild and uncontrollable during post-loan collection.
Technology empowerment has two sides: user experience on one side, compliance risks on the other.
2. Capital Dilemma
Beyond performance slowdown, the pressure to replenish capital is imminent.
In 2024, the core Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio dropped to 10.27%, reaching a recent low. The market lacks confidence in its financing ability, and the solution has been frequent related-party transactions—engaging in related-party dealings with CITIC Trust, Baidu Netcom Technology, and others, which can sustain short-term operations but depend on long-term reliance.
A more subtle signal is the change in branding.
Starting from the first quarter of 2025, the public branding shifted from “Bixin Bank” to “CITIC Bixin Bank,” with the logo adjusted accordingly. This emphasizes CITIC Bank’s controlling stake and weakens the independent legal entity identity. This echoes the absorption and merger of Postal Savings Bank and Beijing Bank’s direct banking subsidiaries, actively dissolving the “only survivor” independence.
The deeper contradiction lies in business overlap. Bixin Bank directly competes with CITIC Consumer Finance in areas like loan facilitation agencies and credit customers. Within the same group, two licenses are “fighting.”
Under internal and external difficulties, Bixin Bank is attempting strategic adjustments: reducing dependence on third-party platforms, with self-operated consumer loan balances reaching 45.79B yuan, up 34.52%; increasing the proportion of industrial finance, though corporate loans have shrunk by 90%; strengthening digital infrastructure, and launching large-scale outsourcing tenders for information technology personnel.
However, the window for transformation is shrinking.
Under the “Unified Reporting” policy, cooperation fees with internet platforms are regulated, squeezing profit margins. During a declining interest rate cycle, asset-side yields are under continuous pressure. Under these dual pressures, the business model and past profit logic of internet banks are becoming invalid.
3. From AI Benchmark to Transformation Illusion
The 2025 performance of Bixin Bank is a report on the wild growth of internet banks.
A 28% revenue increase coupled with a 30% net profit plunge indicates a divergence between scale expansion and profitability.
Financial data shows that Bixin Bank’s operating income was about 1.72B yuan in 2020, rising to 3B yuan in 2021, then rapidly increasing to 3.97B yuan in 2022 and 4.53B yuan in 2023. In 2024, it only slightly increased to 4.63B yuan, then surged again to 5.93B yuan in 2025.
According to Beto Business & Beto Finance, Bixin Bank turned profitable in 2021 with a net profit of 263 million yuan, further growing to 656 million yuan in 2022, 855 million yuan in 2023, then declining to 652 million yuan in 2024, and further decreasing to 472 million yuan in 2025, presenting a different landscape.
It once adopted “AI-native” as its risk control philosophy, with “digital inclusive finance” as its mission and vision, and “the first in the country” as its innovation halo. But in the second half of AI finance, compliance management is the key to survival.
Since 2019, the number of direct banks has shrunk from over 100 to more than 10, and mergers and reorganizations of small and medium financial institutions have become routine. Bixin Bank’s “only survivor” is not a moat but an isolated island.
What will be the future path of Bixin Bank?
Source: Beto Business & Beto Finance
Author: Duoke
Disclaimer: This article is for knowledge sharing only, aiming to convey more information! It does not constitute any investment advice. Anyone making investment decisions based on it bears the risks.